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Abstract
The elderly in Russia  have often been among those  least  opportunity to provide what might be termed  "housing
able to cope with all the changes that have taken place  safety net insurance"  at low public cost. More than
during the transition.  Unlike the situation prior to  reducing the incidence  of poverty, such schemes could
reform-when  pensions were stable-they now face  allow also many of the elderly to be  able to move out of
considerable  uncertainty.  If they have not been in  poverty and into middle  income status.
poverty,  many have been  close to it. While the elderly  The authors  explain why many of the elderly in the
have  experienced  difficulties, they have  also been the  former Soviet Union (FSU),  not just in Russia, are likely
beneficiaries  of a very  large transfer of wealth. In Russia,  to have so much housing wealth. Then they discuss  how
as in most transition economies,  housing was privatized,  financial instruments could  access this wealth.  The
under giveaway terms.  As a result, although many elderly  authors also discuss the empirical  situation of the elderly
households have low incomes,  based on their wealth,  in Moscow, illustrating  the potential demand for such
their deprivation would appear to be  less serious.  products.  Finally, they  suggest that the results for
Unfortunately,  in the absence of a developed  financial  Moscow are likely to be similar in many other FSU
system, it is difficult to  use this wealth without selling it.  countries because these  countries  also have elderly
In Russia, all households, not just the elderly,  have  not  populations who also own a great deal  of unencumbered
been  able to borrow.  housing wealth.
The existence of such large unencumbered wealth
holdings by lower income  elderly households  creates an
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In some ways the elderly in Russia have not been particularly disadvantaged by the
transition process.  For example, a number of studies, e.g., the World Bank (1995) and (2000)
show that the likelihood and the intensity of poverty of elderly-headed  households have been
similar to that of other groups.  One-parent  families with children are far more likely to be poor,
and they have much lower average  incomes than do the elderly. (Braithwaite (1995)).  However,
the experience of the elderly has certainly been difficult, and in many ways, they have often been
among the most vulnerable and those least able to cope with all the changes that have taken place
(see Lokshin and Yemtsov, 2000).
For example, in the period between  1992 and the economic  crisis of 1998, more than half
of the elderly households in Russia experienced poverty for at least a brief period of time
(Lokshin and Popkin, 1999).  Furthermore, in the 1998 banking crisis, the elderly were more than
twice as likely as others to lose their savings.  Moreover,  the size of the loss -- over 80 percent of
the household's savings -- was also considerably larger than that experienced by other families.'
Finally, while most of the elderly are not strictly poor, many have income levels only slightly
above the poverty line.2 About a third of Russian elderly households are lower income
households which we define as being either poor or what we call near poor.3
Thus, unlike the situation prior to reform -- when pension payments were stable and the
elderly paid almost nothing for health care, housing, and transportation  -- in the new economic
order, they now face considerable uncertainty and often have difficulty making ends meet.  If
they have not recently been in poverty, many have been close to it.  Moreover,  they often face the
likelihood of penury unless they can function effectively in the much more complex economy.
However, according to Lokshin and Yemtsov (2000) urban pensioners  are the demographic
group least likely to have a response strategy for dealing with their new environment;  In
addition, macroeconomic  volatility has made the timely payment of their pensions  questionable.4
At the same time, economic reform has made the prices of many basic services considerably
higher.  In sum, the living circumstances of many of the Russian elderly have become more
complicated, often accompanied by lower incomes and by considerably  shorter expected life
spans.
While elderly households have experienced some income difficulties, they have also been
the beneficiaries  of a very large transfer of wealth.  In Russia, as in most transition economies,
housing was privatized, essentially under give-away terms (see Struyk and Kosareva,  1994).
' Based on analysis of the 1998-99  Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Study.
2  Analysis of Wave 4 (December  1995)  of the Moscow Longitudinal  Household survey reveals that 22 percent of
elderly households are "near poor,"  i.e., with incomes less than 50 percent above the poverty line.  Over 35 percent
of single elderly households  are near poor.
3 We define the "near poor" to be households with incomes between 100 to 150 percent of the poverty line a figure
within the range of a number of poverty-oriented  programs.  For instance, in the US for the Food Stamp Program,
eligible individuals have incomes  130 percent of the poverty guidelines; for the National School Lunch Program,
there are two income thresholds:  one is for individuals  with incomes with incomes between 130 and  185 percent of
the guideline; for the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance  Program, individuals with incomes  up to  150 percent of
the poverty guidelines  are eligible (Ways and Means Committee,  Print WMCP:  105-7; 1998  Green Book, U.S.
Government Printing Office.)
4  For example Bohlen (1999)  shows that in  1998 pension payments were more than $3 billion in arrears.
1Indeed, as we discuss below, by 1995 just the lower income elderly had title to housing assets on
the order of $1 1 billion, an amount equal to more than half the capitalization of the Russian stock
market.  As a result, although many of these households have low incomes,  based on their newly-
acquired wealth, their deprivation would appear to be less serious.  Once again, the data appear to
suggest that the elderly have not suffered  disproportionately  during the transition.
Unfortunately,  however, in the absence of a developed financial system, it is difficult  to use
housing wealth to address  income concerns. In particular,  because housing is both long-lived and
largely indivisible,  a significant portion of house value represents the present value of the future
flow of services.  Realizing this future income requires either being able to borrow against the
expected  future income stream or the sale of the asset.'  In Russia, households  in general, not just
elderly households, have had little ability to adjust their portfolios by borrowing  funds.  They
have not been able to do so because the economy's volatility has been so severe that financial
markets in general,  and longer term mortgage markets in particular, remain largely undeveloped.
The existence of such large unencumbered wealth holdings by lower income elderly raises
a number of questions.  First, are there financial  instruments that would permit them to unlock
this wealth if they wanted to do so?  The answer to this question may be "yes," as suggested by
the very active program of such loans in the U.S., and the existence of similar, albeit less
frequently used, programs in Canada, Germany, France,  and the U.K.  If so, then a second
question arises:  Is it likely that the disruptions experienced by the Russian financial system
account for the lack of such instruments in Russia?  If the answer to this question is also "yes" as
would not be surprising given the severe disruptions Russia's financial sector has experienced,  it
prompts a third question: can a social safety net mechanism be constructed that would address
these poverty concerns at relatively low costs?
To anticipate our conclusions, the existence of the elderly holding so much housing wealth
at the same time that they have lower incomes creates an opportunity to provide what might be
termed "housing safety net insurance."  Moreover,  the provision of this form of insurance could
be done at low public cost.  But more than reducing the incidence of poverty, we also show the
Russian elderly hold so much housing wealth that these financial instruments could allow many
of them the possibility of being able to move out of poverty and the risks of becoming poor and
into middle income status for the rest of their lives.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next three sections we answer the questions
posed above.  That is, we first review why many of the elderly in the Former Soviet Union
generally,  not just in Russia, are likely to be owners of so much housing wealth.  Then, in section
three, we focus on what would be involved with the elderly using financial instruments to access
these savings.  This review highlights how general asymmetric  information problems associated
with writing annuity contracts,  particularly when these contracts involve housing, have been dealt
with in market economies.  We briefly discuss some of the circumstances  in Russia that could
compound these sorts of problems.  In a fourth section we consider the empirical situation of the
5  Subletting part of the unit is also possible and Lokshin and Yemtsov (2000)  show that in response to the  1998 crisis
3 percent of Russian families moved in with relatives. They also show that 5 percent of households changed their
residence, presumably trading down for less housing.  This latter figure was almost  10 percent for households  in the
lowest four income quintiles.  In addition, data on migration from the north of Russian indicates that as much as 20
percent of pensioners had sublet their apartments and moved from the region while retaining their locational
subsidies.
2elderly in Moscow in more detail.  This description first illustrates the potential demand for such
financial products.  Then it attempts to determine whether the housing wealth of the elderly could
provide a platform to ameliorate some of their poverty problems.  Finally, it provides an
illustration of how an approach could be structured  as a low-cost form of social safety net
assistance.
In a penultimate section we briefly describe a spontaneous  financial innovation that
occurred in the US in response to  a similar sudden creation of a large number of income-
constrained illiquid wealth holders - i.e., the precipitous change  in the expected life spans of
AIDs patients with life insurance contracts.  We then discuss some of the similarities and
differences between this situation and that of the elderly in transition economies.  A final section
concludes; it highlights some of the implementation problems and possible benefits of such a
program.
II.  The Housing Wealth of the Elderly in the Former Soviet Union.
Housing accounts for a large share of wealth among the elderly in the Former Soviet
Union, so large that the ratio of house value to current income is considerably higher than it is in
market economies.  We argue that this result is not an artifact of the data.  It is a result of both the
effects that the transition process had on the level and composition of savings, and the way
housing was produced and allocated under the old regime.
One way to consider the broad effects of the transition process on the share of housing
wealth held by Russian households is by comparison with the U.S.  In the much more financially
diversified U.S. economy, housing accounts  for more than 95 percent of the wealth of more than
75 percent of elderly households.6 In Russia, where in the early years of reform household
financial  savings were ravaged by inflation rates of more than  1000 percent per year, according  to
Easterly and da Cunha (1994) much of the value of household financial assets was lost.  In such a
context, it is not surprising that so much wealth is held in the form of housing, particularly since
the value of residential real estate is positively correlated with at least mild rates of inflation.
But more important than the effects of the transition are the effects of idiosyncratic
historical factors.  Three factors  cause the elderly in the Former Soviet Union at the present time
to hold both a large share of their wealth in housing and for that form of wealth to be large
relative to current income.  First, the housing delivery system of the old regime resulted in a
higher mean and lower variance in the size of the average housing unit than occurs in market
economies.  That is, at the same time that the average  Soviet household had more housing space
than did its counterparts  in market economies, so too was the variation in the amount of housing
across income groups considerably less.7
6 Caplin, Chen, Freeman and Tracey (1997).
' Evidence that households  in Russia had more housing than did their market economy counterparts  is provided by
Hegedus,  Mayo, and Tosics (1996)  and Struyk (2000).  Both studies show that although the rationing system of the
FSU produced administrative shortages of housing, it also produced more housing space per capita than did market
based systems in countries  with similar income  levels.  Indeed,  the average amount of housing per capita in Russia
corresponded to that supplied in countries with per capita incomes more  than 30 percent higher.
.3At the same time that the average household received more housing than they would have
under a market system, it also had considerably less to choose from as far as the size of a
particular unit.  That is, as long suspected and shown by Buckley and Gurenko  (1998), unlike the
situation in market economies,  in the former Soviet Union housing allocation was not demand
driven.8 Under this system, individuals with higher incomes  were either not able to have larger
units produced for them, or they could do so only through constraining circuitous and semi-legal
routes.  The result was that there was significantly less variation in the amount of housing
services consumed by households in Russia than is the case in market economies.9
The result of this kind of housing allocation system is that relative to income the average
size and, correspondingly,  usually the value of a housing unit tends to be larger than it would be
in a market economy.  In addition, the Russian system not only produced more housing per
capital than did market economies,  it also produced smaller units much closer in size to the
average unit than is the case in market economies.
Second, unlike the almost continual improvements  in the quality of construction inputs that
occurs in market economies, in the Former Soviet Union the opposite happened.  Housing
produced under Stalin was of a much higher quality than the housing produced in later periods
when massive, high volume housing production programs took place. Romanik and Struyk
(1996), for example, show that a prime determinant of the rate at which housing was privatized
in Moscow was its value.  They also show that Stalinist housing was privatized twice as quickly
as were units built later under Khrushchev.  Their results are consistent with those of Guzanova
(1998)  who presents evidence that Stalin-era buildings were worth more than twice as much as
Khrushchev-era  ones.
As a result, in Russia certain types of older housing often tend to have a higher amenity
value than does newer housing.  It follows that occupants of the older buildings would tend to
reside in more valuable properties.  Given Russia's relatively low pre-reform household mobility
(see Guzanova,  1998),  and the constraints  on the ability to bid for housing services prior to
economic reforms, it is likely that a large share of the occupants of these pre- 1956 built units are
pensioners.  Thus, as our data indicates, elderly households would tend to have both more space
and better amenities.
Finally, the elderly often lived not only in better locations,  but in locations that carried a
significant locational premium.  As shown by Bertaud and Renaud (1997), the housing supply
system of the old regime operated without a land-market.  As a result, land prices were not used
in decisions  as to how many units should be constructed on a site.  Consequently, the ratio of the
cost of structural inputs to land inputs was largely ignored.  In such a system there was less
redevelopment of land sites to higher densities than in a market economy.  This system also
8  Buckley and Gurenko (1998)  estimnate that in 1992 the income elasticity of housing demand in Russia was zero.  In
an earlier study, based on interviews with emigres, Alexeev (1988) found a positive but low income elasticity
suggesting  that even his lower estimates imply constrained demand.
9 Buckley and Gurenko (1997)  show that when imputed housing income is taken into account  in measures of income
the relatively larger units held by lower income families reduce the increase in inequality in income distribution
observed  in post reform Russia by far more than is the case in market economies.  For example,  including the
imputed  income from housing changes the estirated Gini coefficient by 6 percentage points.  In contrast,  Yates
(1994) shows that including measures of imputed housing services  in income had almost no effect on income
distribution in Australia, changing  it by one percentage  point.
4produced such low central city urban densities that the underlying land value of many of these
properties is now extremely high.  Consequently,  this work implies that older housing in Moscow
has considerably higher site amenity value than does newer housing.  Once again, in the old
regime older households were much more likely to reside in such units than were younger
families.
Cumulatively, these factors help explain why our results indicate that in 1995 the elderly
still lived in better neighborhoods  as well as in better quality and larger units than did other
families.' 0 The value of the housing that elderly households  received in the privatization
program was large relative to current income.  Of course, informal market relations under the old
regime, deaths, and more explicit exchanges since the reforms began would tend to offset these
effects.  However, in Russia in the mid- 1  990s, for their level of income, the elderly still had more
housing than is the case in market economies.  Indeed,  as we will show, the ratio of housing to
income tends to be multiplicatively larger than the same ratio in market economies.
III.  Financial Instruments for Elderly Homeowners.
On a conceptual level, it has long been noted that simple financial schemes are possible
which would permit elderly households to tap their housing savings.  The simplest schemes  that
would permit this are the home equity conversion lines of credit frequently used in many OECD
countries.  Under these schemes homeowners  are able to borrow against housing at a lower
interest rate because of housing's strong collateral value.  With the existence of a mortgage
market, these schemes  can be used relatively easily to address periodic bouts of poverty.  But in
addition to being able to draw down on existing wealth, other relatively simple financial
instruments may be particularly attractive to the retired elderly.
For example, financial instruments  can and have been used to access housing wealth in
such a way that this wealth can be drawn down in regular and certain payments over the
homeowner's life.  The payments could have the structure of a pension plan, a payment stream
that can be particularly comforting to an elderly person with limited alternative  income
possibilities and an uncertain life span.  These latter types of instruments,  known as reverse
annuity mortgages, have been provided by public and private lenders in a number of countries.
In the U.S., for instance, over the past twenty years more than 200,000. of these loans have been
issued largely, but not exclusively, without subsidy."1  Similar financial arrangements have been
in use in the U.K.,  Canada, France,  and Germany.  Indeed, while not provided by the private
sector in transition economies,  this approach is also being implemented on a small scale by a
public agency in Moscow.  12  Moreover,  these kinds of exchanges  have also been long
'° According  to Guzanova (1998)  Stalin-era apartments that are  located in the city center cost $ 147,000, while those
located in the outer districts cost $ 95,000.  The price of a Khrushchev-era  unit ranges from $ 27,000 to $ 60,000
depending on its proximity to the city center.  She also shows that the elderly are owners of some of the better
properties  in the city.  For instance, even though the per capita family  income of elderly households  was more than
25 percent lower, they were  more likely to live  in prestigious  locations in the city center,  and in "superior"  quality -
meaning brick construction -- as well as larger apartments,  and in buildings with fewer maintenance  problems.
1 See Kutty (2000),  and Szymanoski (1999)  for a discussion of the evolution of reverse mortgage  loans in the US.
12  The Moscow prograrm,  called Mossotsgarantia,  was created in 1995 with authorized  capital of 55 million rubles.
It is designated to provide  social assistance to lone pensioners and invalids in exchange  for the voluntary  conveyance
5undertaken in socialist economies where a pensioner would bequeath the tenancy rights to his or
her apartment upon death to a caregiver in return for care during their remaining life.'3
Reverse mortgages provide  homeowners with a loan collateralized by the equity in the
home. In contrast to regular mortgages  in which the buyer makes monthly payments to the lender,
with a reverse mortgage the process is "reversed,"  the homeowner receives payments from the
lender, thereby increasing rather than reducing debt as is the case with the more traditional
mortgage instrument.  The lender uses the value of the home as an eventual source of repayment
and accrued interest.  The payments to the homeowner can also be structured as an annuity,
making the reverse annuity mortgage a special case of a general annuity contract.
Annuities  are contracts between an insurance company and an individual under which the
insured person receives a monthly sum as long as he or she lives in return for a one-time  flow of
premium payments.  The market for annuities in the U.S. has grown rapidly in recent years, with
more than 23 million individual annuities in force in 1995,  and almost $800 billion in reserves to
cover the promised payments to individuals.'4 To illustrate, consider the situation of a 65 -year -
old man purchasing a typical $100,000 single-premium  annuity.  In return for the payment of this
premium, he would receive a monthly payment of $ 794 for the duration of his life.  Because
women on average live longer than men, a 65 -year -old woman would be eligible for a monthly
payment of only $648.  Similarly, because the older a person is the shorter is his or her expected
life span, older purchasers will receive higher monthly payments.  For instance, a 75 -year-old
man making the same purchase described above would receive over $1,000 per month.' 5
Currently in the U.S. there are several public and private sector programs available which
allow older homeowners  to use their housing equity as the basis for the purchase of an annuity or
a reverse mortgage.  These contracts usually entail either one-time payments targeted toward
specific purposes, such as home repairs, or annual payments to be used to cover property taxes or
defer payments for holusing repair expenditures.  As is the case with all annuity contracts, private
companies offer a variety of payment options, including up-front lump sum payments, fixed
monthly or annual payments, credit lines, or a combination of the three.  Payments may be made
for a specific time period or as long as the homeowner lives in his or her home.  The common
feature of reverse mortgage programs, whether annuity or not, is that the lender is repaid from the
proceeds of the house value when the homeowner dies or moves from the house.
Lenders face various risks in offering reverse mortgage loans.  Most importantly, they face
the adverse selection risk that characterizes  all annuities.  This risk arises because borrowers
know more about future mortality than do lenders.  As a result, those individuals with shorter
than expected mortality may not purchase the annuity leaving only those with average or longer
expected mortality in the pool of annuitants.  With this composition of annuitants, a lender would
make more payrnents than predicted by the expected mortality rate.  Certainly the mortality tables
of their properties to the city.  The Government  of Hungary has also prepared a study of the desirability of
establishing such a program
13 Problems can arise with such individual based  life annuity schemes.  For example,  there is the well known French
experience of a Madame Calmant of Arles who wrote a viager,  i.e. - reverse mortgage - contract with a notary public
at the age of 75.  Her notary predeceased  her as she lived to be  122.
4 American Council on Life Insurance  (1996)..
Data on payment rates are from Mitchell et al. (1999).
6for the general population  and annuitants  in the U.S. indicate much lower mortality rates for the
latter group.
As argued by Diamond (1977) such adverse selection is the primary reason that market
failure has characterized annuity markets in the U.S.  However, Mitchell  et al. (1999) show that
in the U.S. the scale of the costs of adverse selection has declined significantly over time.  Hence
while there still are market imperfections that reduce the supply of such loans in the U.S., over
time, these obstacles are declining  so that the elderly are increasingly able to buy annuities at fair
prices.  There are also other nontrivial moral hazard problems involved in buying a reverse
annuity mortgage that are not present in typical annuities - such as whether after the transaction
the homeowner will continue to maintain the home.'6
IV.  The Potential Demand for Financial Instruments by Elderly Homeowners  in Russia.
Outside of the approximately 2,300 reverse annuity mortgages made available by the city
of Moscow by early 2000, in Russia there is no supply of reverse annuity mortgages, or for that
matter any kind of annuity.17 There are any number of reasons why this might be the case.  For
example, given the disruptions that the financial  sector and the economy has experienced,  the
problems for lenders in making such loans go well beyond the adverse selection and moral
hazard concerns of market economies.  To mention just the most obvious problem with
supplying such loans, they are longer term and few long-term loans are being supplied by the
Russian financial sector.'8
There are also problems in the housing market that compound the contracting problems
that occur in market economies.  In particular, very little progress has been achieved in
establishing responsibilities for maintenance  and upkeep of residential common areas.  Now,
after ten years of such neglect, many buildings face significant deferred maintenance  problems.
The risks of providing households credit based on the stability of the value of a housing unit in
such an environment is, of course, problematic.  Finally, there is the question of trust.  Many
Russian households have lost most of the value of their cash savings either through inflation or
the collapse of a bank.  These families are unlikely to be aggressive demanders of financial
products that give the title of their only safe asset to a financial institution.
Recognizing that outside of one small program there is a lack of supply, our approach
considers what the possible potential  demand could be.  That is, we use the approach taken by
Merrill et al. (1996) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000), to
consider the possible demand for these loans.  To do this we first estimate whether there are a
large number of elderly households with enough housing wealth that they could in effect
reshuffle their "savings portfolios."  In other words, are there many households with both
sufficient housing wealth and low incomes who could use a revere mortgage to markedly
improve their situation if there were means available to do so?
16  See Szymanoski  (1994).
'  Program size of Mosstsgarantia  is small:  as of November  1999, only 2,337  contracts were signed.  The average
monthly payment of 947 rubles (less than $ 40) is not indexed for inflation and is not differentiated according to the
sex of the borrower (Interview with Irina Urevina Balzamova, General Director, Mossotsgarantia,  November,  1999).
18  See, for example, Bernstam and Rabuska (1998).
7The answer to this question requires information  on the extent of housing wealth required
to generate  a sufficient income stream,  as well as information on how long this income stream
has to last. That is, how old are the owners and how much housing wealth do they have.  For the
U.S., Merrill et al (1996) argue that the potential demanders of reverse mortgages would be those
with lower incomes,  i.e. incomes less than $30,000 per year, and with house equity of at least
three times that amount.  With these restrictions they find that about 12 percent  of the U.S.
elderly-headed households,  or about  1.5 million households, would be potential demanders of
reverse mortgages.
For Russia to make a similar calculation requires three kinds of empirical data for the
elderly: income; the value of the housing owned by them, particularly by those with lower
incomes;  and, finally, their expected life span, what is known in the insurance industry as the
"life tables."  Using this information,  one can determine of how much of the poverty of the
Russian elderly could in principle be addressed by new financial instruments.
Empirical Methodology.  We combine income and housing data from the Moscow
Longitudinal Household Survey (MLHS) with Russian life tables for men and women.  '9 We use
them to modify an actuarial model devised by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development to answer to two empirical questions.  First, is there a significant  group of elderly
with substantial amounts of home equity and limited income who might benefit significantly
from increased  liquidity? Second, is the age distribution of the elderly population such that the
payments that could be realized are large enough to lower the incidence or incidents of poverty?
Our use of data on Moscow, rather than the entire country, is dictated partially by data
availability with respect to housing. Moscow  does differ from the rest of the country.  Socio-
economic conditions are unquestionably more favorable  in Moscow.  Pension incomes are
higher, reflecting higher relative cost-of-living prices and an additional cash supplement provided
by the local government.  Finally, the Moscow real estate market has tended to be more active
than most other markets, and apartments command prices above those in other cities, as
described below. Consequently, our results cannot be taken as representative for the entire
country.  We present the evidence on Moscow as a first, if somewhat exaggerated,  empirical
perspective on the issue.  We suspect that if there is not potential demand in Moscow it is not
likely to be present elsewhere.
Due to the limited availability of socio-economic indicators, we use total monthly
disposable income in the analysis.  This figure includes wages and salaries,  social security
transfers, private transfers, and unearned income.  We use the designated poverty line for
19 The MLHS is an annual panel survey of 2,000 dwellings  conducted every December in 1992-1995.  We use data
collected in the fourth wave, in December  1995.  The data set contains comprehensive information pertaining to
housing, including estimates on unit values, housing types, housing conditions,  and privatization experiences.  It also
contains important demographic information about the household, such as the number and ages of family members,
and sources of income.  With the exception of housing assets, absent from the data set are non-income sources of
wealth and consumption estimates which are important  in determining the household's true standard of living.
However,  we are reassured by the fact that the salary estimates produced by the data are comparable to those
reported in official statistics for the same time period. The average salary in the sample is 947,000 rubles compared
to 930,600 reported by the State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat).  1996.  Sotsial  'no-Ekonomicheskoe
Polozhenie  Rossii, 1995 g., p. 487.
8Moscow city households reported in Round 6 of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Study
(RLMS).20
The value of the units was estimated using two self-reported measures.  Respondents  who
purchased their apartments were asked to say how much they paid.  Respondents who had not
purchased were also asked if they knew the value of apartments similar to theirs which had been
recently sold, and if they could provide  a dollar figure.  The residents who responded to these two
questions provided a sample of 381 observations  which was used to estimate a model of hedonic
house price characteristics.  Before estimating the model, high and low outliers were assigned
an appropriate per square meter price.  The model imputes the price per square meter, adjusted
for various qualitative characteristics  which when multiplied by the unit's total space, yields an
approximation of the unit value of constant quality.  All independent variables included in the
final model were significant at the .10 level or higher.
Analysis of the data indicates that a substantial share of pensioner households have
incomes that hover just above the poverty line.  Just under one-quarter of all elderly households
and over one-third of single (mainly female-headed)  elderly households are near poor.  If we
were to extrapolate  the figures presented  in Table 1 to Moscow, we would find that the number
of lower income elderly households  living alone or in couples is about  164,000, slightly more
than 5 percent of all of the households.  This group comprises what we term the "social safety net
eligible"  component of the market for reverse mortgages and other financial products.  These are
the pensioners who have the legal right to sell their apartments. If we extend eligibility to include
all households containing an elderly person with total income not exceeding  150 percent of the
20 The RLMS was carried out in October, just one month prior to the MLHS.  We increased  the poverty line by 5
percent to account for inflation and other adjustments.  The 5 percent figure reflects the increase between the
October and November official poverty lines reported by the  State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat).  1996.
Sotsial  'no-Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Rossii, 1995 g., p. 487.  This poverty line was developed by researchers  at
the University of North Carolina in collaboration with the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, the
Institute of Nutrition,  Russian Academy of Medical  Sciences,  and Paragon Research International.  It is based on the
cost of food baskets designed to meet the nutritional  needs of men, women, and children of varying ages.  Thus, the
poverty line consists of a set of thresholds for five population groups: men and women in the post-work ages (ages
60+ and 55+, respectively),  working-aged men,  working-aged  women, and children under 7 years of age, and
children aged 8  to 18.  The poverty line for elderly persons in 1995  is:  191,257 rubles.  The thresholds are adjusted
with equivalence scales  ranging between .68 to  I  according to the size of the household.  For detailed information on
the construction of the RLMS poverty line,  see: Popkin et. al.  (1996).  The subsistence  minima reported in the State
Comrnittee of Statistic publications  have been criticized  for being too high and thus, unrealistic.  See for example,
Poduzov and Kukushkin  (1999).  The subsistence minimum for the elderly living in Moscow in November.1995  is
160 percent  higher than the RLMS poverty line.  We also experimented with other poverty lines, including  the
official poverty line for Moscow city (known as the subsistence minimum (prozhitel  'ni minimum)). The subsistence
minima for the five population groups were considerably higher than the poverty thresholds used in the RLMS and
identified 48 percent of pensioners to be poor compared with other official estimates of 18 and 19 percent. However,
when the RLMS poverty thresholds were applied, the share of the sample deemed poor  fell.to 8.2 percent, about 10
percentage points less than the official estimates. When the two samples of elderly and non-elderly households  are
compared, the figures are very similar:  9.5 percent of Moscow households are poor in the RLMS,  compared to 11
percent in the MLHS. We thus employ a restrictive poverty definition in which only a smnall fraction of the elderly
population is identified as being poor.
21  This model was developed by Claire Romanik at the Urban Institute.  It is described more fully Romanik and
Struyk (1996).
9poverty level, an extension not permitted, for example by the Moscow agency which makes such
loans, then the number increases by another 80,000 families.  In sum, under the broader
definition, slightly more than 8 percent of Moscow  households would be eligible. 22
Table 1. Pov erty Incidence (in Percent)
Poor  Near Poor  N
All Elderly Households23 8.2  21.9  318
Single elderly households  1.8  35.6  83
Elderly couple households  0.0  11.5  17
Not surprisingly,  given our earlier discussion of the housing delivery system of the old
regime, the data analysis finds that the value of the housing units occupied by the elderly poor is
not far below that occupied by the elderly non-poor.  The median value was $50,387 for non-
poor households and $45,826 for poor households (1995  dollars).  The poor are equally likely to
live in the city center and live in superior apartments  as the non-poor.  In short, as expected, they
hold a significant  amount of housing wealth.  An approximation of the size of the asset base that
could be annuitized by lower income elderly can be calculated by multiplying the mean price by
the number of near poor elderly households. According to our broader definition of eligibility
that would include almost 250,000 housing units worth more than $45,000 each, or about $11
billion.24
Thus, since the near poor elderly in Moscow account for only about one-third of elderly
households, the total amount of housing wealth held by the elderly is potentially enormous.
Based on McHale and Pankov (1999), for example, it is an amount that was more than half of the
$20 billion capitalization of the stock market in the same year.  One reason this figure is so large
is the legacy of the past that we discussed earlier.  For example, the 20 percent of elderly
households who have incomes in the lowest income quintile own housing worth an average of
$44,503.  As a result, the house price-to-income ratio for these elderly households is 37, a figure
that is more than 6.5 times higher than the typical house price to income ratio reported  for
families in OECD countries  in 1990 by Hegedus, Mayo  and Tosics (1996).  When the average
monthly income of elderly couple households with incomes 50 percent above the poverty
standard is only $111  per month, owning an apartment worth on average over $40,000 makes
these families, by almost any imaginable standard, unusually house - rich and cash poor.
In principle, then, there is a large potential demand for home loans and other types of credit
by the "house-rich yet cash poor" elderly.  The final step in determining whether this wealth
could be used to reduce poverty is to convert this wealth into an individual income stream.  To
22Only lone pensioners who are 65 years and older, married couples in which the spouse has reached the age of 65,
single Group 1 invalids who are 55 years and older, and single Group II invalids who are 60 and older are eligible to
participate  in the City of Moscow Reverse Annuity Mortgage Program. Under current law,  all household members
registered  as living in a dwelling unit must agree to privatize the unit before it can be privatized.  Thus, for the sake
of simplicity, we confine the analysis to households which contain elderly members  only.
23 Elderly households include multi-generational  households that contain an elderly family member who may or may
not be the household head.
24 With the devaluation of 1998  this value  is of course lower in dollar terms.
10do this we employ the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development's actuarial model used in
underwriting the insurance it provides  for qualifying reverse annuity mortgages.
This model allows us to determine the maximum  amount of credit that, for instance, a
typical  elderly Russian woman living alone could safely borrow against the value of her
apartment.  It estimates the amount that can be borrowed, under conservative  assumptions about
house price appreciation  and interest rates, such that an insurance premium collected from all
borrowers would provide a sufficient cash reserve to cover losses from cases for which the loan
principal plus accrued interest would exceed the value of the house at loan termination.  An
analysis of the program shows that over the past decade that the HUD program has operated on
an actuarially sound basis (Rodda and Lim, 2000).  The model has been simplified and adapted
with Russian single year mortality tables.
The model's primary function is to provide an estimate of the share of house value,  based
on actuarial tables and assumptions about house price behavior, that could be safely borrowed for
each combination of borrower age and expected interest rate-- what is terrned the principal limit
factor.  This factor can be seen as the present value of the annuity expressed  as a percentage of
the property value; see Szymanoski  (1994) for a discussion of the details of the model.  This ratio
can then be multiplied by the property value to give the dollar limitation for a specific  loan.  By
pooling premiums and estimating future losses based on house appreciation,  interest accrual,  and
mortality rates, the model estimates the actuarially fair share of house value that can be converted
into debt for the insurance premium rate charged.
Table 2 illustrates the derivation of the principal  limit factor for a 75  year old female
borrower  at interest rates between 8 and 12 percent, with the highest rate approximating the
current dollar interest rate for mortgages in Russia.25 With the underlying assumptions that
annual mean nominal house price appreciation will be 5 percent - so that real interest rates are
about 5 to 7 percent -- with a standard deviation of 10 percent,  the result is a principal limit
factor of 0.495.  That is, the table indicates that for a small fee a borrower can insure lenders that
the present value of the payments on a reverse mortgage equal to about half the value of a house
will not exceed the initial property value.
Table 2.  Principal Limit Factors for Russian Women
Interest  Age  of Borrower at Loan Origination
R  ate  __  _  _  __  _  _  _
Rate___  65  . 75  85
8.0%  0.511  _  0.629  _  _  0.747
10.0%  0.359  0.495  =  0.645
12.0%  0.255  0.390  0.557
25 In 2000 interest rates on dollar-denominated  mortgages were  in the 1  0- 15 percent  range for most banks (Pastukova  and
Rogizhina, 2001, Table 6.1); and since then macroeconomics  conditions have improved.The table also shows principal limit factors for other combinations of borrower age at
closing and interest rate.  For any given interest rate, older borrowers have higher principal limit
factors.  Similarly, for any given borrower age,  lower interest rates produce higher factors.  The
table shows quite concretely the benefits of macro stability.  A more stable macroeconomic
environment - e.g., one that lowers interest rate from  12 to  10 percent -- can increase the amount
that can be borrowed by about 10 percent.  The estimate assumes an annual nominal property
appreciation  of 5 percent, with a standard deviation of 10 percent.  26
One way to consider the implications of the data in Table 2 is to consider the income
stream that could be generated for a hypothetical elderly person without reference  to other
sources of income.  For instance, consider the prospects  faced by 65 and 75  year old women at
alO percent interest rate (the middle row of the table).  These individuals would be able to
borrow approximately  36 and 50 percent of their house value,  respectively.  Based on our
estimates of 1995 house value, this corresponds  to about $15,000 and $23,000.  To be
conservative, assume that they can convert their premium payments into annuities at a rate say 30
percent  lower than that provided by the more competitive  U.S. market.  In this case, they would
be able to receive the following life-time monthly payments:  the 65 year old would receive
monthly payments of $86;  and the 75 year old monthly payments of more than $160.  The former
figure on an annualized basis equals $1,042,  a figure which by itself is only slightly below the per
capita median income of $1,147  in 1995.  The latter annualized figure of $1,920 would, without
relying on any other source of income, place the annuitant firmly in the rniddle class.
But, rather than just focusing on the income stream that could be generated by this
financing, we also take another, more poverty-oriented  perspective.  Consider how this income
stream might be used to "top up" other forms of income.  For this perspective we focus on the
situation of the average elderly homeowner whose current income leaves him or her in poverty.
We then calculate how much that person would have to borrow to avoid having an income less
than 150 percent of the poverty line.
For example, consider the case of an elderly Russian woman living alone experiencing a
poverty spell at some point in her uncertain  life span as being an insurable, even if off past
trends,  as a likely event.  At present, the occurrence of such an event in Russia is, in some
respects,  like the situation facing a car driver in the U.S.  Over a long period of time the driver is
quite likely to realize some relatively small insurance claim for damage to his or her car, even if
he or she is a good driver.  However, even if the Likelihood of experiencing the event in both
cases is high, the average loss per insurable event is in both cases relatively low.  That is, in the
Russian case the amount of income needed to avoid poverty after other sources of income have
been exhausted is small, particularly relative to the amount of housing wealth.
Suppose, to continue the example, that the elderly homeowner  had the ability to dissave
from her housing wealth only during periods of poverty. That is, they could do this only under
suchforce majeure circumstances that this ability could be viewed, in some ways, as being
similar to the pay-out on a deductible insurance contract - i.e., paid out only after other sources
26 This assumption is consistent with the behavior of residential real estate prices in Moscow.  In ruble terms the
price in 2001  of housing is slightly higher in 2001  than it was prior to the crisis. See the web page of the Russian
Guild of  Realtors.  If the loan were denomninated  in dollars, not rubles,  this assumption may not be sufficiently
conservative.
12of income have been used and some definable event occurs.  In this case, a single elderly
annuitant would need to borrow less than one-third of one percent of house value; elderly couples
would need to borrow less than one-fifth  of one percent of house value per year.27 With this rate
of capital decumulation most elderly should be able to use these instruments to avoid poverty,
and still be able to provide bequests of a substantial proportion of their home at the time of their
death.  When the poverty spell was a one-time event, the premium,  even with accumulated
interest, should usually be a small share of total house value.28
In short, there appears to be considerable  latitude to exploit the existing distribution  of
wealth in ways that address the income concerns of the lower income elderly.  Certainly this is
the case in Moscow and we suspect elsewhere too.  It is of course true that we cannot say how
many of the more than the 250,000 lower income, elderly households in Moscow would in fact
demand such instruments.  To mention just one of the difficulties  with such estimates, as argued
by Venti and Wise (1990),  the demand in the U.S. has been lower than anticipated largely
because many households  apparently want to preserve their house as a last resource.  However,
while it is true that U.S. homeowners have not embraced  the annuity based instruments that
would ultimately yield their ownership rights, they have, as Fratantoni  (1999) shows, been quite
willing to borrow to protect themselves against unanticipated  shock.29 It is also the case that for
the Russians:  (1) the income shocks experienced have been much more severe than those that
motivated U.S. borrowers; (2) their income is much lower; and (3)  the house value to income
ratio of many would permit such insurance with little reduction  in the value of their housing
bequests.  30  Thus, abstracting from the trust and information concerns, we would expect that a
substantial portion of Russia's 38 million pensioners would be interested-in these loans.
Before concluding we first briefly review the experience of a recent spontaneous
emergence of a similar market for financial  services -- the establishment of a secondary market in
life insurance policies.  We review this event because we want to consider both some of the
broader gains and impediments to the introduction of the kinds of financial instruments generally
offered by a market economy.
V.  Reverse  Annuity Mortgages  in Russia and Viatical Settlements  in the U.S.
As shown by Kohn  (1994), in recent years viatical settlements, or more morbidly "death
futures," were a financial market response to the AIDs epidemic.  Today, these trades allow even
perfectly healthy people to trade their life insurarlce benefits upon their death for a cash payment.
27 In 2001  Sberbank,  the largest deposit-taking bank with the most branches in Russia, began to make Pensioner
ATM  Cards available. Such cards could be a convenient  way to access such assistance.
28  One could argue, as do Lokshin and Yemtsov (2000),  that making timely payments of pensioners'  income is the
government's  responsibility and not an obligation that should be shifted onto pensioners. However,  this
responsibility has been repeatedly violated by government,  and at present house rich pensioners  often have no other
option but to reduce  consumption  to very low levels.
29  He shows that it is this preference  for such protection that drives the disproportionate  demand for the line of credit
rather than reverse annuity mortgages.
30 House prices are higher in Moscow, but, relative to pensioners'  incomes, are nevertheless  high elsewhere as well.
For example, under reasonable  assumptions  about the amount of housing consumed,  our data indicates that for
families of two pensioners the house price to income ratio was  15.8 in St. Petersburg,  20.0 in Kaliningrad, and 17.2
in N. Novgorod in 1997.
13Like reverse mortgages these transactions essentially involve a "bet" on when death will occur.
The experience  with these instruments  is of some interest in determining whether the market, by
itself, will be able to bring a sufficient number of buyers and sellers together so that transactions
occur.
In this instance, until there were a large number of people with reasonably certain and
shorter than had been expected life spans, as well as high needs for current income, there was no
market for such trades.  Until the establishment of this secondary market for their policies many
U.S. life insurance beneficiaries held assets which yielded a return which could be realized only
after it would have been useful for addressing current, often catastrophic,  income concerns.  In
effect, this secondary market permitted policy-holders to react to changing circumstances.  With
it, they could opt out of the perhaps ultimate "deferred gratification" implied by life insurance
pay-outs after their death.  Like homeowners with reverse mortgages they could use some of their
illiquid future wealth to pay for current needs.
The viatical experience suggests that if left to their own devises, markets do eventually
develop.  However,  it also suggests that development may require a catalyst to reach some
threshold level, such as the simultaneous appearance of many demanders of a product.  For
elderly Russian homeowners there is no question that housing privatization there has lead to a
rather sudden creation of a potential market demand.  What is considerably less clear is whether
these potential demanders understand the possibilities implied by their wealth, and whether they
trust market-based financial mechanisms to help realize these possibilities.  In such a context,
and particularly given the informational complexities involved, a public role would appear to be
justified.
VI.  Discussion  and Conclusion
The answers to the questions raised at the beginning of the paper all appear to be positive,
suggesting that reverse mortgages could contribute to an effective safety net for pensioners in
Moscow.  They might also be expected,  according to a recent Bank of Japan Report, Nakagawa
(1999) to help address pension reform issues in aging societies.  Moreover,  given the potential
scale of the demand implied by current housing wealth, the situation of the elderly in Moscow or
even Russia is by no means an isolated event.
14Figure 1
Share of the Population Older than 60
n  <10%  1Z10-15%  15-18%  18-20%  0  >20%
As highlighied by Figure 1, the elderly share of the population of many of the transition
countries is higher, and sometimes considerably higher than it is in developing countries where 9
percent of the population are elderly,  or even the older OECD countries, where the elderly
account for 14 percent of the population, see World Bank (1997).  The transition countries  tend
to be older societies.  Moreover,  they are societies where poverty among the elderly has increased
substantially even if  not disproportionately.  Poverty has increased at the same time that the
elderly have become owners of significant amounts of unencumbered  housing wealth.  At the
same time, financial markets remain underdeveloped throughout the region and, at least in the
short run, are unlikely to be able to innovate to address these potential demands.
Of course, it may be expensive to overcome the elderly's potential initial lack of both
understanding of the product or distrust in the providers of such services.  However, these costs
should also be weighed against the effects that the transition process itself has imposed on the
elderly through changes  in the distribution of risk.  In particular, by changing the income streams
of the elderly from being among the most stable in the economy to being among the most
volatile,  the transition has made pensioners among the most vulnerable to shocks of all groups.
Unlike younger worklers, many of the elderly have little in the way of marketable human capital
15(Brainerd,  1999).  In addition,  outside of their housing wealth, the only source of income for
many elderly families has been public pensions, the produce of their garden plots, and transfers
from family members.  The first and last of these sources of income are likely to be particularly
sensitive to broader economic trends.  That is, when macroeconomic  conditions deteriorate  so
too, and usually by even greater extent, may these sources of income.
Thus, from a financial perspective the general problem faced by the elderly in Russia is not
so much that they are poor as it is that their wealth holdings are under-diversified.  As a result
they are much less able to exploit their wealth to cushion the shocks they have experienced.  It
follows that a policy that helps them diversify their risk exposure would be an effective
component of the social  safety net even if the unsubsidized demand for these transactions was
low or non-existent.
There are, of course, also problems with the introduction of such instruments.  One is the
difficulty of anticipating  all the effects of their widespread adoption.  For instance, not only
would the elderly be affected by the provision of such instruments but so too could be others
who,  as a result, would be less able to purchase the housing units that the elderly continue to
occupy.  Countering this particular view is the low anticipated mobility of the elderly in any case.
In addition, it worth noting that by 2002 on the order of half of the pensioners alive when the
transition began have already died, and therefore are not longer holding their units off the
housing market.  Hence, the effects of such instruments on the rate of market development  are
likely to be both small and rapidly decreasing.
Another potential impact is on housing maintenance.  Some observers believe that one of
the reasons that the Russian housing stock continues to experience under-maintenance  is that
many households cannot afford to make the necessary payments.  As we have shown, however,
many of the families thought to be unable to pay have substantial housing wealth even if they
have low incomes.  By permitting low-income families to be able to use their wealth to make
rent and utility payments, reverse mortgages could also have beneficial welfare effects beyond
those immediately engaged in the transactions.
Another problem with these instruments is that the costs involved with marketing the
concept and implementation  of the necessary financial control mechanisms could be very high.  It
may, for instance, be expensive to explain to an elderly borrower the fair price for a reverse
mortgage.  The difficulty arises because the contract would in many ways be similar to the trade
of a lifetime annuity for what is essentially an elderly household's sale of a "call" option on their
property.  Valuing such a transaction may be particularly difficult for elderly households who
have limited experience with financial  assets, may have lost his or her savings due to bank failure
or who has heard stories of fraud and corruption relating to housing.  Indeed, the initiative to
create the Moscow-city agency that makes such loans arose at least in part in response to
concerns that the elderly were being exploited by unscrupulous real estate dealers.
There is no question that the elderly will tend to need assistance to be able to make
informed judgments about such transactions.  But, it is worth noting that while the actuarial
calculations are not obvious, they are quite mechanical and hence not subject to widely variable
estimates (again see Rodda and Lim, 2000).  In other words, as long as a disinterested  appraisal
and advisory system is in place, it should be a relatively simple exercise to determine the fairness
of the exchange.  That is, the annuity value should not be widely variable across lenders and
accordingly should be easy to estimate.
16Thus, if actuarially fair annuity prices could be generated,  then the only public costs would
be that of assisting the elderly in making informed  decisions and regulating or administering  a
system that did So.31  In Russia these latter costs will be modest, given local wage rates.  In
addition, in contrast to all other components of the safety net, the finance itself would not require
direct subsidies.  In short, the costs would be those of bringing information about opportunities to
a group that has been identified  as marginalized and passive.
Another factor that may limit the usefulness of such instruments  is whether the elderly
would want to use their housing wealth to finance current income expenditures.  We simply do
not know how many of the elderly would rather convey their savings to their children in bequests
rather than dissave.  Certainly, a significant portion of the housing wealth of the Russian elderly,
like that of their American counterparts (see Venti and Wise (1990)) is being held to make such
bequests.  However,  as noted above, these transactions do not have to take the form of an
annuity.  In the U.S. program, by far, the most popular approach  is the one which yields
significant protection  against poverty and yet entails very little reduction in the amount of
housing wealth available for bequests - that is, the equity line of credit during periods of cyclical
stress.
A final reason elderly households may not want to use these instruments is because it
would prevent them from purchasing what might be termed implicit home service assistance.
For example, Bemheim et al. (1996) have shown that in the US one of the most important
motivating factors for bequests is that they are a form of strategic behavior through which the
elderly essentially "purchase" home services assistance from some of their children.
Consider how this motivation might affect the preferences of a younger Russian family who
owns their own apartment and also cares for and is financially responsible for an elderly parent
who has his or her own separate apartment.  One way the younger household could augment
income  is to either rent out or sell one of the two apartments, and move the extended family into
one, often small unit.  With reverse mortgages, in contrast,  this overcrowding could be avoided
without losing the income stream implied by the elderly's wealth.  In other words, an elderly
person might be better able to engage in strategic bequest behavior with a reverse mortgage than
they could by bequesting their unencumbered  apartment to their children.
To conclude, there are many questions relating to the efficacy and management of reverse
mortgages in Russia.  However, given that history has resulted in the Russian elderly having a
good deal of housing wealth relative to their income, and given the costs and risks that the
31  In the U.S. much of  this education is carried out by grants to NGOs from HUD.  Educational  packets for NGOs
have been prepared by Ken Scholen of AARP who has been a leader in this field writing 5 consumer manuals.
17disruptions of the adjustment process have imposed  on them,  at a minimum it makes sense to
investigate further the costs and benefits of expanding the provision of reverse annuity
mortgages.  In addition, because of the important role historical factors appear to play in the
elderly holding so much housing wealth in the FSU, it would be useful to see if the
circumstances  in these other economies yield similar results.
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